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Abstract 
Over 45% of Australians buy health insurance for private treatment in hospital. This is 
despite having access to universal and free public hospital treatment. Anecdotal 
evidence suggests that one possible explanation for the high rate of insurance 
coverage is to avoid long waiting times for public hospital treatment. In this study, we 
investigate the effect of expected waiting time on individual decisions to buy private 
health insurance. Individuals are assumed to form an expectation of their own waiting 
time as a function of their demographics and health status. We estimate models of 
expected waiting time using administrative data on the population hospitalised for 
elective procedures in public hospitals in 2004-05 and use the parameter estimates to 
impute expected waiting times for individuals in a representative sample of the 
population. We model the impact of expected waiting time on the decision to purchase 
private health insurance. In the insurance demand model, cross-sample predictions are 
adjusted by the individuals’ probability of hospital admission. We find that expected 
waiting time does not increase the probability of buying insurance but a high probability 
of experiencing a long wait does. Overall we find there is no significant impact of 
waiting time on insurance purchase. In addition, we find that the inclusion of individual 
waiting time variables removes the evidence for favourable selection into private 
insurance, as measured by self-assessed health. This result suggests that a source of 
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Expected waiting times 
1  Introduction 
In tax-financed health care systems, where the price of health care is essentially zero and 
budgets for publicly-financed health care are capped, explicit waiting lists are the most 
common means of rationing demand. Australia, New Zealand, the UK, Canada and 
Scandinavian countries use waiting lists to allocate non-emergency health treatments at 
public hospitals. Waiting lists for elective surgery serve as a health care allocation 
mechanism which equilibrates supply and demand in the absence of prices. Australians have 
access to universal and free public hospital treatments but 45% of the population choose to 
buy health insurance for private hospital treatment. This is despite paying significant 
insurance premiums and facing potentially large out-of-pocket expenditures when treated as 
a private patient. Anecdotal evidence suggests that duplicate public and private coverage is 
partially driven by long waiting lists and waiting times for the free public hospital treatments. 
Another advantage of having private health insurance in Australia is that it gives private 
patients choice over the settings of care. For example, private patients can choose to be 
treated in private hospitals, nominate their own doctors, and have private accommodation. 
There are also financial incentives to insure, comprising both a subsidy to premiums and a 
tax on the high-income uninsured.  
In this paper, we investigate how an individual’s expected waiting time for elective surgery in 
public hospitals influences their decision to buy private health insurance. As waiting is costly 
(e.g., Besley et al., 1999; Johannesson et al., 1998), waiting times are potentially a major 
factor driving individuals’ decision to buy health insurance. To our knowledge, this is the first 
study that explores this relationship at the individual level, modelling individuals’ expected 
waiting times as a function of their own demographics and chronic conditions. Furthermore, 
the data available are very detailed, involving over a hundred different categories of chronic 
conditions.  
To empirically test the relationship between waiting time and insurance purchase, we need 
data on both insurance and waiting time. However, no single large data set in Australia 
contains both of these variables: household surveys provide information about insurance 
status but have no waiting information, while waiting time administrative records from 
hospitals contain unreliable information on health insurance. To overcome this difficulty, the 
analysis combines information from three data sets. First, the National Health Survey (NHS) 
2004-2005 is used to provide data on insurance, health conditions, lifestyle factors, income 
and socio-demographics. This is the main data set from which the insurance equation will be 
estimated. Second, linked Inpatient and Waiting Times (IWT) data for elective surgery  
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admission to public hospitals in New South Wales (NSW) in 2004-2005 is used to estimate 
waiting times for different demographic groups and regions and for various health conditions. 
The parameter estimates based on the IWT data are used to impute mean waiting time and 
probability of a long wait for each NHS observation taking into account the probability of a 
hospital admission. Third, the Household Expenditure Survey 2003-2004 is used to construct 
expected premiums associated with insurance purchase for each NHS observations.  
We estimate a series of insurance demand models, where insurance status is assumed to be 
a function of expected waiting time and the probability of a long wait. We also investigate 
how the independent effects of variables commonly found to influence insurance demand 
(e.g., Savage and Wright, 2003; Ellis and Savage, 2008; Fiebig et al., 2006) are affected by 
the inclusion of expected waiting times measures. For example, high-income individuals may 
value time more highly, and buy insurance to avoid waiting. If so, significant income effects 
on insurance purchase found in previous studies may be picking up the effects of expected 
waiting time that is absent in these models. Similarly, the positive relationship between self 
assessed health status and insurance demand in Australia (e.g., Doiron et al., 2008; 
Buchmueller et al., 2008) may be due to the omission of waiting times in models of insurance 
demand.  
2  Literature  
Waiting for health care is costly for individuals because a good is worth less today if its 
consumption is delayed (Lindsay and Feigenbaum, 1984), and also because delay in 
medical treatment may prolong suffering, decrease earning capacity and cause deterioration 
of quality of life in general for the duration of wait. For example, Leung et al. (2004) find that 
patients who value time highly tend to choose private treatment that is readily accessible and 
are prepared to pay to reduce waiting time to treatment. Propper (1990; 1995) and 
Johannesson et al. (1998) also find evidence that individuals are willing to pay to avoid 
waiting for medical treatment. They find that willingness to pay is non-trivial on average, and 
varies with income and other socio-economic characteristics. Some individuals will prefer to 
opt out of free public sector treatments to avoid waiting times even if the private alternative 
involves out-of-pocket payments to the providers of care. Many such individuals will 
purchase private health insurance to smooth their health care spending. 
Besley et al. (1999) estimate an insurance demand model using repeated cross-section data 
on individuals in the UK. By utilising regional variations public hospitals’ waiting lists, they  
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find that the size of waiting list increases the probability of individuals buying insurance. 
Jofre-Bonet (2000) reaches similar conclusion using data from Spain.  
When waiting time data is not available, studies have used some measure of perceived 
quality of public hospital (Costa-Font and Font-Vilalta, 2004; Costa and Garcia, 2003; 
Johannesson et al., 1998). Costa and Garcia (2003) use expressed satisfaction with the 
public system as an indicator of quality. They find that perceived lower quality of the public 
sector increases the probability of purchasing private insurance in Catalonia. In Ireland, 
where the relationship between public and private health care and private insurance shares 
many similarities with Australia, Harmon and Nolan (2001) find that perceptions about the 
waiting times for public hospital treatment have been a factor in the growth of insurance 
coverage. Asking some 1,100 insurees on reasons for having health insurance, 86% 
nominate ‘[b]eing sure of getting into hospital quickly when you need treatment’ as very 
important. In addition, they ask these respondents to rank 8 of the listed reasons for having 
health insurance, ranging from monetary concern to ability to obtain exclusive treatment, 
77% rank the accessibility factor as the most important factor. Colombo and Tapay (2004) 
write “[i]ndeed, the main reason why individuals buy private cover is to ensure quick access 
to care” [p.43].  
Related literature consists of experimental studies finding that private patient status allows 
timely access to health treatment. Lungen et al. (2008) find some evidence that physicians 
treat patients differently in the waiting list according to their insurance status. In Germany, 
physicians receive 20%–35% higher reimbursement for patients with private health insurance 
than those with statutory insurance. This study recruits callers and assigns them randomly to 
two groups, one with private insurance and the other with statutory insurance. They then call 
private specialist practices and make appointments. Callers with statutory insurance have to 
wait 3 times longer for an appointment than callers with private insurance. In the US, studies 
have also found that the privately insured are ahead of their uninsured counterpart in the 
appointment process (Asplin et al., 2005; Wang et al, 2004). 
3  Theoretical background  
To provide theoretical motivation for insurance purchase, we follow the seminal work by 
Besley et al. (1999). Consumers are utility-maximisers who face some probability of falling ill. 
The treatment options available are either public health care, which is free but may involve 
waiting, or, they can go “private”. Private treatments can be performed at private hospitals or 
public hospitals with private patient status. We assume that private patients are insured.  
     4  
Waiting times and the decision to buy PHI 
They face some positive price but avoid waiting. Utility-maximising consumers buy insurance 
if their expected utility from being insured is greater than that of remaining uninsured. The 
greater is the inflexibility manifested in the public system, the greater would be the gain from 
buying private insurance. Long waiting times in public hospitals is one form of inflexibility in 
the public system.
1  
Let the probability of falling ill be ] 1 , 0 [ ∈ α , and the utility of an individual in the good health 
and bad health state be  ) y ( U  and  ) y ( u , respectively, where  y  denotes income. The 
difference in the utility functions allows for higher marginal utility of income in the good health 
state (Viscusi and Evans, 1990). Assume that 0 U y > ,  0 U yy < ,  0 uy >  and  0 uyy < . Assume 
that falling ill requires non-emergency treatment, for which demand in public hospitals is 
controlled by a waiting list and that private treatment involves zero waiting time. Also assume 
that if treatment is delayed by w  days, the individual’s utility in a bad health state is 
discounted by the function  () w g  where  () () 1 w g 0 1 0 g ≤ ≤ =   and   , and  () ( ) 0 w g w g ≤ − + Δ , 
so that the total utility of an individual who falls ill and spends w  days on a public hospital 
waiting list before being treated is given by  ()() w g y u  (see Martin and Smith 1999). 
Waiting timew  is ex-ante unknown, but individuals know its distribution  () w F  conditional on 
their own health status and demographics, so they can form an expectation, 




=  given their characteristics. Similarly, they use the knowledge of 
their own health conditions and demographics to form an ex-ante expectation of their 
probability of hospital admission,α .  A market for health insurance sells contracts at an 
equilibrium fair premium π  (i.e., the expected costs of private healthcare). In the case of full 
insurance, insured individuals will always choose private hospital treatment. However, if only 
partial coverage is available, insurees incur some out-of-pocket costs for private treatment. 
Let  l be the net expenditure after insurance reimbursement. The expected utility of an 
individual without and with insurance then can be written as 
(1)  () () () () ( ) y U 1 w g E y u EU
0 α α − + =  
(2)  ) y ( U ) 1 ( ) l y ( u EU
1 π α π α − − + − − =  
                                                 
1 Another inflexibility of public health care is that patients cannot choose their doctor.  
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respectively, where α  and w  are assumed to be independent, conditional on individual 
health conditions and demographics. With insurance, income is reduced by the insurance 
premium in either state. An individual will buy insurance if 
(3)  () ( ) () () y , w g E , EU y , l , , EU
0 1 α π α ≥  
The gain in expected utility from buying insurance is greater the larger is the expected 
discounting effect of waiting times () () w g E , the lower is the insurance premiumπ , and the 
smaller is l . For a given functional form of  () w g , the magnitude of  () () w g E  will depend on 
() w F , so in the empirical application we approximate () () w g E  by the features of the 
distribution of waiting times conditional on health status and demographics distribution.  We 
choose two measures which are likely to be important determinants of  () () w g E : the expected 
waiting time and the probability that waiting time exceeds some value towards the upper tail 
of the distribution.   
We have simplified the model by neglecting the presence of individuals who prefer longer to 
shorter waiting times (Cullis and Jones, 1986; Johannesson et al., 1998), and individuals 
who are captive to the public system (Costa-Font and Font-Vilalta, 2004).  
4  Empirical strategy   
4.1  Data 
Our data augmentation strategy follows Fang et al. (2008). The three data sets we use are: 
(i) the National Health Survey (NHS) 2004-2005; (ii) the NSW Inpatient and Waiting Times 
(IWT) data 2004-2005; and (iii) the Household Expenditure Survey (HES) 2003-2004. We 
focus on NHS households that reside in NSW, as the IWT data is based on NSW public 










K j j j j j j j j
K i i i i
, , , , , I
, , w




where  IWT K  and  NHS K  are indicator variables for IWT and NHS samples, respectively. The 
observation unit is an adult aged over 18 years.  
In (4) i w  denotes waiting time, as measured by the number of days between the listing and 
admission (removal) dates that appear only in the IWT data. The variables {} Ζ Η ,  denote 
chronic conditions and demographics (age and sex and their interactions, and geographic 
locations) that are common in both data sets. They are assumed to determine individual  
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expectations of waiting times. There are over 10,000 ICD10AM codes for physician’s 
diagnoses in the IWT data. These codes are much more detailed than the 108 long term 
condition codes used in the NHS data. We obtained clinical advice to first map the ICD codes 
to the NHS codes and then to aggregate these NHS codes to 25 groups of chronic conditions 
clinically relevant to hospital admission, H . For example, the group of ‘eye diseases’ 
relevant to hospitalisation include cataract, glaucoma, and macular degeneration but not 
glasses. 
j I  is an indicator variable for insurance choice in the NHS data,  j Υ  captures variations in 
economic status of individuals (income and education),  j Μ  includes lifestyle variables such 
as measured by smoking status, exercise schedule, alcohol consumption and body weight, 
and use of glasses, and  j Χ  includes other relevant variables available in the NHS data such 
as age, family unit type (e.g., single household, couple with or without dependant), foreign 
born, region and self-assessed health. These variables have been found to influence 
selection into the insurance market (Fang et al., 2008; Buchmueller et al., 2008; King and 
Mossialos, 2005), and variations in the cost of waiting across individuals (Costa-Font and 
Font-Vilalta, 2004). Finally,  j α  is an indicator variable for hospital admission
2 which will be 
subsequently used to estimate an individual probability of hospital admission to be utilized in 
the construction of waiting times variables.  








IW D P ϕϕϕ η
⎧ = ⎪
⎨
=+ + + ⎪ ⎩
 
where 
* ˆ W  is the vector of waiting times variables, including expectation of waiting time and 
probability of extremely long wait, both multiplied by the probability of requiring a hospital 
admission. The model is estimated using information on individuals in the NHS. The 
expected waiting time and probability of extremely long wait are imputed for individuals in 
NHS using prediction models which relate waiting times and incidence of long waits to health 
conditions  H and demographic characteristics D,  and are estimated with IWT data. The 
probability of hospital admission is predicted from a model which relates incidence of hospital 
admission to H and D in the NHS data. These prediction models will be discussed in detail in 
the following sections.  
                                                 
2 The NHS data is representative of the general population, not everyone in this sample experiences a 
hospital episode.  
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The three sets of explanatory variables are the following: D variables affect both health, and 
hence waiting, and insurance demand (age, gender, lifestyle, region, foreign born); P 
variables affect insurance choice alone (income, education, premium, family structure). The 
H variables are measures of health (health conditions, number of conditions and self 
reported health) that consumers use to predict the likelihood of hospital admission and 
expected waiting time conditional on admission.  
We assume that the H variables do not affect the demand for insurance directly, but only 
through their affect on expected waiting time. In our view this makes intuitive sense: in a 
system with free public hospital cover, being less healthy should not increase the demand for 
private insurance per se. It should only affect demand to the extent that ones’ health 
conditions are such that one is more likely to experience an incidence of illness/disease that 
would entail a long wait for treatment. However, we will test this hypothesis by including self 
reported health in the insurance demand equation directly and seeing if it has an 
independent effect from expected wait on insurance demand.  
4.2  Imputation of waiting times variables  
In the IWT sample, we focus on Medicare-eligible public patients who are on the public 
hospital waiting list for elective surgery. They make up more than 80% of the total 
hospitalised population for elective surgeries in public hospitals. The IWT sample consists of 
175,218 observations, so the estimates are likely to be close to the hospitalised population’s 
true parameters.  
To allow for co-morbidities, where some diseases more are likely to occur together than 
others and these interactions are likely to impact on the severity of health state, we use 
factor analysis on the set of 25 health conditions, H. We retain 12 factors, F, with 
eigenvalues larger than one. The factor weights are used to generate corresponding factors 
for the NHS sample. Table I reports the factor loadings. The factor loadings indicate common 
patterns of co-morbidities. For example, IWT factor 1 has high loadings on several potentially 
serious conditions, IWT factor 3 focuses on bone diseases and IWT factor 4 loads highly on 
metabolic and mental disorders. 
Table I 
Summary statistics of waiting time and demographics for the IWT sample are presented in 
Table II. The mean waiting time is 97 days, but 10% of patients wait longer than 291 days.  
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There are slightly more females in the sample than males and almost 70% of patients have 
more than one condition. This highlights the importance of using health factors in the linear 
prediction of waiting time, instead of treating diseases as independent.  
Table II 
The prediction model for expected waiting days is given by  
(6)  01 2 ii i i wH D θθ θ ε = +++   
which is estimated by Ordinary Least Square (OLS).
3 
 We define a long wait as having an actual wait in the top 10% of the waiting time distribution. 
Both anecdotal and aggregate-level evidence (Besley et al., 1999) suggest that people buy 
insurance due to concern about long waits. Thus, we expect individuals with high probability 
of experiencing a long wait to have a higher probability of buying private health insurance. 
The prediction model for the probability of long waits  () Pr 291 days| , ii i wait H D >  is the 
linear probability model:  
(7)  01 2 ii i i lw H D δδ δ ν = +++ , 
where  i lw  is an indicator that waiting time of individual i exceeds 291 days in IWT.
4 
Table III presents the results for Equations (6) and (7). All health factors, except factors 1 
and 9, are significant in both models. The largest positive impact on waiting is from factor 3, 
which represents individuals with bone conditions and fractures and alcohol and drug-related 
conditions (12 days longer wait and an increase in probability of a long wait of 0.02). Factors 
                                                 
3 We maintain the natural scale of the waiting time series despite positive skewness to avoid 
retransformation problems. A smearing correction that assumes homoskedastic variance will only rescale 
the predicted values when we cross-predict to the NHS data, whilst a smearing correction that adjusts for 
heteroskedasticity would either require an  assumption about the form of the heteroskedasticity or involve 
some auxiliary regressions of the squared residuals to estimate the unknown form of the heteroskedasticity. 
Comparing the predicted values from the non-transformed model and a log model retransformed using 
heteroskedastic smearing factor with an unknown form of heteroskedasticity, we find that predictions from 
the former exhibit higher correlation with the actual series. Furthermore, the linear transformation of the 
log model is not mean-preserving. Alternative models to OLS were also estimated including a generalised 
linear model with a log link function and finite mixture models, and it was found that OLS performed no 
worse, if not best, in terms of predictive power than these competing models. We also tested for 
interactions with region and number of conditions but they did not contribute to the explanatory power of 
the model. 
4 Because the IWT sample contains no data on self assessed health, the H vector contains chronic 
conditions and number of conditions. Self assessed health enters W ˆ through the probability of admission.  
  
     9  
Waiting times and the decision to buy PHI 
8, 10 and 11 generate somewhat longer waits; these load heavily on respiratory and 
metabolic conditions (factor 8), osteoporosis (factor 10) and varicose veins and other vein 
diseases (factor 11). The largest negative impact on wait (over 30 days shorter and a lower 
probability of a long of 0.06) is from factor 4; this has high positive loadings on mental and 
stomach conditions and a large negative loading on eye conditions. The latter is a reflection 
of long waiting times for cataract surgeries (over 6 months) compared with other elective 
procedures. Factor 6 lowers expected wait by about 16 days and has a high positive loading 
on diseases of female pelvic organs and genital tract.  
With regard to demographics, there is a positive age gradient, with those aged less than 40 
waiting less compared with those aged 40-45 and those age 60 or more waiting longer 
(except for those aged over 84). The longer waits for those over 60 are significantly greater 
for females. There is a strong positive gradient on the number of conditions: those with 5 or 
more conditions wait on average 25 days longer than those with 1 condition. This positive 
gradient is likely to represent complexity, as the gradient on conditions is reversed when 
diseases enter the model as independent variables, instead of as factors. Lastly, expected 
wait for patients living in major cities and inner regional areas are longer than those who live 
in outer regional areas. This result may be explained by variations in supply conditions, such 
as available beds. Having multiple conditions also increases the probability of long wait. 
Patients in major city and inner regional areas are more likely to experience a long wait than 
outer regional residents. 
Table III 
Figure 1 indicates how well the mean waiting time predictions fit the waiting time data. It 
ranks observations by predicted wait and plots the average predicted wait (X-axis) against 
the data mean wait (Y-axis) for every 5
th percentile of the predicted values.  The figure shows 
that the predictions fit the data well, but underestimate slightly in the tails of the distribution. 
Figure 1 
We use the estimated Equations (6) and (7) to impute the expected waiting time and the 
probability of a long wait for each person in the NHS sample. The NHS sample comprises 
3,989 observations. The imputed variables are: 
(8) 
j 2 j 1 0 j j
j 2 j 1 0 j j
ˆ X ˆ ˆ w l ˆ ) lw ( E
ˆ X ˆ ˆ w ˆ ) w ( E
Ζ δ δ δ
Ζ θ θ θ
+ + = =
+ + = =
.  
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In the cross-sample predictions, no predicted waiting times are negative and none of the 
predicted probabilities of a long wait lie outside the unit interval.  
The expected waiting times and probability of long wait must be adjusted by the probability of 
requiring hospital admission. It is possible that an individual who is likely to face a long 
waiting time once she requires hospital treatment has a very low likelihood of needing the 
treatment. Such an individual would not try to insure against a long wait because her 
chances of actually experiencing it are very small. Hence, the effect of waiting times depends 
on the probability of requiring hospital admission. To account for this in the insurance 
demand model we multiply the predicted conditional waiting times variables from equations 
(8) by the probability of hospital admission, which is estimated using data on incidence of 
hospital admission of individuals in NHS.  
4.3  Admission probabilities and insurance premiums 
About 18% of the NHS sample had a hospital episode in the last 12 months. Just as co-
morbidities matter to waiting time, so they affect probability of admission. For this reason, we 
conduct factor analysis on the NHS sample using the 25 health conditions. Table IV presents 
the NHS factor weights. Factor 1 is a ‘bad health’ factor which loads highly on many serious 
conditions. Factors 2, 3 and 5 load highly on several conditions.  
Table IV 
Table V presents the summary statistics of the NHS data used to model admission.  Hospital 




0 1 2       
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j A  is a continuous and latent variable measuring the net benefits of hospital 
admission,  j A  is the observed admission status,  j X  include demographics, lifestyle 
variables and region and  j X  includes NHS factors and self assessed health. We assume j ψ  
to be normally distributed and estimate the coefficients using a probit regression. We denote 
individual probability predictions from the model as j ˆ α .  
Table VI presents the results for hospital admission model. The bad health factor, NHS 
factor1, has a significant and positive effect on admission probability. Factors 2, 3 and 5 are  
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also associated with higher probability of admission but to a lesser extent. Factor 2 has large 
loadings on mental health, alcohol and drug-related conditions, epilepsy and migraine. The 
highest loading for factor 3 is on diseases of male organs and factor 5 loads heavily on 
fractures and congenital abnormalities. Age, weight, smoking and exercise, and location 
have low predictive power on hospital admission. The foreign born are less likely to be 
admitted, while non-drinkers are more likely to be admitted than drinkers.  
Tables V and VI 
We next calculate an “effective” health insurance premium for each observation. Neither the 
IWT nor NHS samples contain data on premiums. We construct a premium variable using 
available information on age, income, and income unit type in the NHS data. Due to the 
community rating system in the Australian market for private health insurance, insurers 
cannot price discriminate based on individuals’ observable risk factors, such as age and past 
claims. For a given contract, price varies according to whether the insurance contract covers 
a single person, a sole parent, or a couple (with or without dependants). For each individual
j  we construct the expected premium associated with insurance purchase based on a 
standard hospital cover policy.
 To calculate the “effective” premium,  j ˆ π , adjustments are 
made to the standard premium to reflect the impact of several government policies. First, the 
Lifetime Health Cover adds 2% to the price for each year individual j  was uninsured since 
his/her 30th birthday. The age surcharge is capped at 70%. Second, there is a government 
rebate of 30% (in 2004-2005). Finally, the premium is adjusted by the Medicare Levy 
Surcharge (MLS) of 1% taxable annual income for those not having private health insurance. 
The levy surcharge is applicable to singles earning over $50,000 and couples earning more 
than $100,000, with each child after the first in the family increasing the threshold by $1,500.  
The use of the third data source, HES, is related to this last adjustment. In particular, we 
need to construct a household gross income series. In the NHS, the income variable is top-
coded and adjusted by household composition. For each equivalised income decile and 
household composition combination, we find the corresponding household non-equivalised 
income using the HES sample. The MLS has an important implication for the private health 
insurance market because it can attract high-income earners into the market to avoid a high 
levy surcharge which over certain income levels can exceed the cost of the standard 
premium.  
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4.4  Insurance purchase and expected waiting time 
The augmented NHS data then can be written as: 
(10)  {} ˆ ˆˆ ˆ ,,, ,,,,
NHS
jjj jj jjj jK Iw l wP D S απ
∈ ,  
where  j I  indicates insurance status, j ˆ α is predicted probability of admission,  j w ˆ  and  j w ˆ l  are 
predicted mean wait and predicted probability of a long wait,  j ˆ π  denotes insurance premium 
and Medicare levy status ,  j P  are income and education variables,  j D  are demographics, 
region and lifestyle variables, and  j S  are self assessed health status. Here we separate  j S , 
from  j D . Recall that we hypothesize that S should not affect I directly but only through its 
effect on expected waiting times. But in some specifications we include it to test this 
hypothesis. Conversely, we also want to test if the “advantageous” selection pattern (i.e., 
people with better SAH tend to buy more insurance) is an artefact of excluding expected from 
the insurance demand equation.    
We use factor analysis on the lifestyle variables (exercise, body mass, smoking and alcohol 
consumption) to allow for interactions and derive ‘types’ of individuals distinguished by their 
lifestyles. Table VII presents the lifestyle factor loadings for the 5 factors. LFactor 1 has 
loadings consistent with an ‘average’ type of person: overweight but not obese, moderate 
exercise and drinking, and low smoking. LFactor 2 we term ‘bad’: obese, heavy smokers and 
heavy drinkers. LFactor 3 types, termed ‘lazy’, are sedentary smokers who don’t drink and 
don’t reveal their weight. In contrast LFactor 4 are ‘aspirational’ types who exercise, drink a 
bit but don’t smoke, and conceal their weight but are not thin. LFactor 5 types, the ‘driven’, 
are extreme exercisers who are underweight, do not smoke or drink and don’t wear glasses.  
Table VII 
Table VIII presents variable means by insurance status. The mean predicted waits and the 
probability of a long wait are almost equal for the insured and uninsured, however the 
uninsured are more likely to be admitted to hospital. The characteristics of the insured 
sample are not surprising: relative to the uninsured sample, they tend to be born in Australia, 
richer, highly educated, are not in the retirement pool and live in the city. Overall the MLS 
exceeds the insurance premium for 8.8% of individuals in the sample; most of them are high 
income earners (in the 9
th and 10
th deciles of the income distribution) or couples with 
dependent(s). For these observations, we set their premium to zero and flag this with a  
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dummy variable. The proportion of the insured sample facing the MLS is over 4 times that of 
the uninsured. 
Table VIII 
The insurance demand model can be written as: 
(9) 
*
01 j 2 j 3 4 5 6 ˆˆ ˆˆ ˆ () ( ) S jj j j j j j j Iw l w P D φφ α φ α φ πφ φ φ ϑ =+ ⋅ + ⋅ + + + + + 
where 
* I  is the latent utility from having insurance and  1 = I  if  0
* > I ,  and ϑ  is the random 
component of the insurance demand.  
Table IX presents a series of regression results for linear probability models of insurance 
demand. Model 1 has no expected wait variables but includes all other controls, including 
self assessed health. Model 2 includes mean predicted wait and predicted probability of a 
long wait and all controls except for self assessed health. Model 3 tests for an independent 
effect of self assessed health once waiting variables are included.  
Table IX 
In model 1 there is a strong gradient on self assessed health: those with worse self reported 
health are significantly less likely to purchase insurance. This result is consistent with much 
of the literature which finds that the insured are a favourable selection of the population.
5 
However, after the inclusion of waiting time variables (model 3), the effects of self assessed 
health on insurance demand are substantially reduced, especially for poor health, and no 
longer significant at the 5% significance level.  
This result supports the hypothesis that self assessed health affects insurance demand 
through its effect on health-related concerns, which include waiting time, and has no 
independent effect on insurance demand. The favourable selection commonly found in 
insurance demand models may be partly due to failing to control for the effect of waiting time. 
In particular, because waiting time is negatively related to both insurance and health, omitting 
it from the model results in negative bias in the effect of bad health on insurance demand. 
 
                                                 
5 This has been reported previously (see Propper, 1989; Hurd and McGarry, 1997; Shmueli, 2001; Cardon 
and Hendel, 2001; Asinski, 2005; Fang et al., 2008; Doiron et al., 2008; Buchmueller et al., 2008). 
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Across all models, the impacts of other controls are stable. Higher income and education 
increase insurance demand, consistent with the usual findings.  Single person families, the 
young and those living outside of major cities are all less likely to be insured.  Lifestyle 
factors have different impacts on insurance choice. Factors for the ‘average’ and ‘driven’ 
types are insignificant. Having ‘bad’ lifestyles lower the probability of insurance, while ‘lazy’ 
and ‘aspirational’ lifestyles raise it. These results are broadly consistent with an association 
between risky behaviours and lower risk aversion. The insurance premium and Medicare 
Levy Surcharge have the expected signs but are insignificant. One possible explanation for 
this could be measurement error in the insurance premium because without data on actual 
premiums we assume individuals choose a standard plan with a given co-payment and 
adjust the effective premium for the impact of policy rules. The adjustments are highly 
correlated with other controls included in the models particularly income. An alternative 
explanation could be the relatively low level of insurance premiums in Australia compared to 
other countries like the US or UK and the price insensitivity of consumers. The introduction of 
the insurance rebate in 1999, for instance, had almost no impact on insurance take-up of the 
population (Private Health Insurance Administration Council, 2004). 
Focusing on model 2, we find that expected waiting time has a negative and significant 
coefficient and that expected probability of a long wait has a positive and significant 
coefficient.
6 At mean values, the elasticities of insurance to expected wait and probability of a 
long wait are -0.396 and 0.263, respectively.  
Figure 2 
Figure 2 shows the predicted insurance probability across the distribution of expected wait. 
The lower part of the figure shows the joint distribution of predicted expected wait and 
predicted long wait. For example, of those falling in the 10% of observations below the 
median of predicted expected wait, 42.6% also fall in the 10% of observations below the 
median of predicted long wait.  The upper part of the figure plots the predicted impact on 
insurance across the distribution. The likelihood of a long wait is specified at: (i) its mean in a 
given percentile of expected wait (shown by dots connected with a dashed line, with an 
                                                 
6 The expected waiting time is an imputed series however unlike the problem of generated regressors (see 
Pagan 1984), which involves predictions of variables within a data set, the actual waiting time variable is not 
available in the NHS data. Hence, the usual correction to the standard error of the coefficient estimate that 
involves residuals is not possible in this case. Fang et al. (2008) deal with a similar problem by assuming 
additive measurement error that is homoskedastic and independent. In our case, due to the extremely large 
sample size of the IWT data, the variance of the expected waiting time estimates is almost negligible 
(0.00000676). Nevertheless, in all models, White’s heteroskedastic robust standard errors are used.    
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associated 95% confidence interval) and (ii) the distribution of long wait about the mean 
(scatter plots). All other variables are specified at their sample means. For comparison, we 
also plot predicted insurance without waiting time variables (solid line).  
 
The scatter plots shows that although the probability of a long wait tends to move together 
with expected wait, there are individuals who are more likely to experience a long wait than 
an average person with similar expected wait: 7% of the sample have a predicted probability 
of insurance that is above the upper bound of the predicted probability for an individual with 
average probability of long wait. These individuals tend to be older, single females, in low 
income deciles, and not reporting their health as very good or excellent. Overall, waiting has 
a positive impact on insurance demand for 33% of the sample. For the majority of the 
population, on average, waiting time has no significant effect on insurance decision.  
 
5  Conclusion 
The aim of this study is to test the popular conjecture that waiting times in public hospitals 
drive private health insurance demand. Our approach is novel in the waiting time literature, in 
that we allow the expectation formation of waiting times to vary by individuals. To do this, we 
augment survey data with predictions of waiting times modelled using administrative data.  
We find that in general expected waiting time has a negative impact on insurance purchase 
and that only a likelihood of wait in the very upper tail of the distribution increases the 
probability of insurance purchase. Overall we find there is no significant impact of waiting 
time on insurance purchase. There are however some subsets of the population who fall in 
the very upper tail of the distribution of waiting time, for whom waiting increases their 
predicted probability of buying insurance. One possible explanation for the high insurance 
rate in Australia not explored in this paper is that other aspects of quality such as doctor 
choice drive insurance demand more than waiting times.  
Another key finding is that the inclusion of waiting time variables removes the independent 
positive effect of self assessed health on insurance demand. This suggests that part of the 
commonly found favourable selection effect of reported health status on insurance is due to 
concern about waiting time among healthier people.    
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Malignant neoplasm  0.054  -0.199  -0.090  0.008  -0.681 -0.126 0.238  0.104  -0.131  0.127  -0.191 -0.026 
Benign neoplasm   -0.324  -0.098  -0.407  -0.060  -0.167 0.208  -0.037 0.040  -0.023  -0.089 -0.157 0.013 
Diabetes 0.525  -0.075  -0.328  -0.188  0.102 -0.040  0.022 0.065 0.011  -0.303  0.014 -0.057 
Mental disorders  0.050  0.212  0.018  0.381  0.027  0.205 0.324 -0.154  -0.114  -0.111  0.005 0.109 
Eye diseases  0.316  0.095  0.010  -0.571  0.304  -0.158 0.319  -0.251 -0.094  0.115  0.003  0.089 
Ear diseases  0.040  0.062  0.109  0.096  0.077  -0.201  0.344 0.054 0.495  -0.095  -0.318  -0.032 
Parasitic diseases  -0.089  -0.002  0.111  0.204  0.112 -0.264  0.266 0.136 0.501  -0.197  -0.099  -0.029 
Heart diseases  0.642  0.084  -0.275  -0.018 0.033  -0.041 -0.014 0.133 -0.044  -0.049  -0.051  -0.003 
Nervous system  0.219  0.203  0.228  0.113  -0.052 0.214  -0.064 -0.271 -0.065  -0.368 0.003  -0.070 
Varicose veins   -0.014  0.023  0.064  0.003  -0.059 -0.156 0.036  0.088  0.211  0.079  0.837  -0.012 
Stomach diseases  -0.246  0.324  -0.505  0.367  0.165  -0.262 -0.239 -0.190 -0.002  -0.012 0.056  0.020 
Respiratory problems  0.121  0.198  0.026  0.215  0.147  -0.141  0.136 0.410 -0.358  0.229 -0.083  -0.038 
Skin diseases  0.007  -0.023  0.160  -0.008  -0.466 -0.046 0.242  0.123  -0.058  -0.122 0.189  0.012 
Bone diseases  0.340  0.353  0.307  0.073  -0.204  0.158 -0.302  0.063 0.121  -0.014  -0.063  0.040 
Urinary system  0.264  -0.548  0.053  0.257  0.161  0.103 -0.105  0.007 0.072  0.075 -0.037  0.049 
Congenital abnormalities  -0.001  -0.033  0.082  0.126  0.133 0.234 0.148 -0.163  0.057  0.269 0.107 -0.507 
Fractures 0.002  0.208  0.383  -0.141  -0.061  0.027 -0.450  0.062 0.125  -0.016  -0.166  -0.085 
Anaemia 0.013  0.005  -0.334  0.121  -0.132  0.155  -0.073 -0.074 0.260  0.095  -0.027 -0.057 
Metabolic disorders  0.147  0.100  -0.204  0.082  0.088 0.244 -0.015  0.483 0.041  -0.237  0.112 -0.153 
Thyroid gland  0.121  0.183  -0.081  0.050  0.029  0.268 0.084 0.332 0.059  0.270 0.012 -0.065 
Alcohol & drug  -0.201  0.103  0.254  0.126  0.208  -0.336  0.000 0.298 -0.317  -0.049  -0.064  -0.030 
Epilepsy  0.016  0.140  0.088  0.256 0.029 0.223 0.335 -0.281  -0.230  -0.055  -0.014  -0.164 
Migraine -0.017  0.068  0.034  0.123  0.026  0.176 0.102 0.034 -0.015  -0.149  0.102 0.738 
Osteoporosis 0.153  0.226  -0.014  0.017  -0.011  0.154 0.052 -0.030  0.217  0.592 -0.073  0.287 
Diseases of female organs  -0.350  -0.270  0.114  -0.196  0.298 0.480 0.103 0.249 0.025  -0.082  -0.021  0.061 
Diseases of male organs  0.168  -0.428  0.097  0.315  0.129  -0.153 -0.173 -0.061 -0.077  0.144  -0.062 0.132 
All other symptoms  0.366  -0.322  0.128 0.254  -0.020 0.000  -0.052 -0.052 -0.014  -0.017 0.105  -0.011  
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Table II: Means of IWT variables 
 
Variable Mean  Std.  Dev.  Min  Max 
Waiting time (days)  97.120  154.621  1  2820 
Wait>P90 0.100  0.300  0  1 
Male 0.448  0.497  0  1 
Age<20 0.011  0.103  0  1 
Age 20-24  0.035  0.184  0  1 
Age 25-29  0.042  0.201  0  1 
Age 30-34  0.056  0.230  0  1 
Age 35-39  0.060  0.237  0  1 
Age 45-49  0.073  0.260  0  1 
Age 50-54  0.072  0.259  0  1 
Age 55-59  0.083  0.276  0  1 
Age 60-64  0.086  0.281  0  1 
Age 65-69  0.103  0.303  0  1 
Age 70-74  0.107  0.309  0  1 
Age 75-79  0.105  0.307  0  1 
Age 80-84  0.059  0.235  0  1 
Age 85+  0.038  0.192  0  1 
Male*age<20 0.005  0.072  0  1 
Male*age 20-24  0.014  0.119  0  1 
Male*age 25-29  0.016  0.127  0  1 
Male*age 30-34  0.020  0.141  0  1 
Male*age 35-39  0.022  0.147  0  1 
Male*age 45-49  0.029  0.167  0  1 
Male*age 50-54  0.031  0.174  0  1 
Male*age 55-59  0.038  0.192  0  1 
Male*age 60-64  0.043  0.202  0  1 
Male*age 65-69  0.053  0.223  0  1 
Male*age 70-74  0.055  0.229  0  1 
Male*age 75-79  0.056  0.229  0  1 
Male*age 80-84  0.024  0.154  0  1 
Male*age 85+  0.014  0.116  0  1 
No conditions  0.041  0.197  0  1 
2 conditions  0.304  0.460  0  1 
3 conditions  0.212  0.409  0  1 
4 conditions  0.117  0.321  0  1 
5 conditions  0.049  0.215  0  1 
Major city  0.480  0.500  0  1 
Inner region  0.361  0.480  0  1 
 N  175218          
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Table III: IWT models for waiting time and long wait 
 
   Wait time  Long wait 
   Coeff.  Std. Err.  Coeff.  Std. Err. 
IWT factor1  -0.052  0.477  0.0027  0.0009*** 
IWT factor2  -6.066  0.376***  -0.0100  0.0007*** 
IWT factor3  12.221  0.367***  0.0210  0.0007*** 
IWT factor4  -32.706  0.380***  -0.0613  0.0007*** 
IWT factor5  1.486  0.369***  0.0059  0.0007*** 
IWT factor6  -15.939  0.377***  -0.0214  0.0007*** 
IWT factor7  -5.010  0.373***  -0.0071  0.0007*** 
IWT factor8  5.323  0.391***  0.0079  0.0008*** 
IWT  factor9  0.164 0.361 0.0013 0.0007* 
IWT factor10  5.006  0.373***  0.0099  0.0007*** 
IWT factor11  6.139  0.357***  0.0058  0.0007*** 
IWT factor12  -0.594  0.357*  -0.0017  0.0007** 
Male  3.902 2.784 0.0041 0.0054 
Age<20 -2.784  5.035  0.0056  0.0098 
Age 20-24  -8.146  3.020***  -0.0063  0.0059 
Age 25-29  -12.550  2.797***  -0.0152  0.0055*** 
Age 30-34  -10.697  2.551***  -0.0122  0.0050** 
Age 35-39  -4.323  2.513*  -0.0076  0.0049 
Age  45-49  1.144 2.416 -0.0015  0.0047 
Age  50-54  1.882 2.465 0.0058 0.0048 
Age  55-59  0.837 2.423 0.0046 0.0047 
Age 60-64  6.004  2.455**  0.0074  0.0048 
Age 65-69  13.424  2.391***  0.0263  0.0047*** 
Age 70-74  14.576  2.396***  0.0347  0.0047*** 
Age 75-79  14.977  2.428***  0.0343  0.0047*** 
Age 80-84  11.699  2.660***  0.0301  0.0052*** 
Age 85+  -10.892  2.934***  -0.0072  0.0057 
Male*age<20 -5.993  7.378  -0.0063  0.0144 
Male*age  20-24  0.327 4.749 0.0120 0.0093 
Male*age 25-29  8.791  4.494**  0.0213  0.0088** 
Male*age 30-34  11.412  4.170***  0.0195  0.0081** 
Male*age  35-39  5.467 4.085 0.0154 0.0080* 
Male*age  45-49  0.960 3.856 0.0098 0.0075 
Male*age 50-54  -5.403  3.840  -0.0059  0.0075 
Male*age 55-59  -5.661  3.711  -0.0079  0.0072 
Male*age 60-64  -11.075  3.680***  -0.0113  0.0072 
Male*age 65-69  -13.946  3.554***  -0.0220  0.0069*** 
Male*age 70-74  -9.951  3.531***  -0.0209  0.0069*** 
Male*age 75-79  -10.902  3.542***  -0.0189  0.0069*** 
Male*age 80-84  -10.088  4.076***  -0.0169  0.0080** 
Male*age  85+  6.704 4.702 0.0102 0.0092 
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Table III: IWT models for waiting time and long wait (continued) 
   Wait time  Long wait 
   Coeff.  Std. Err.  Coeff.  Std. Err. 
No conditions  -28.009  1.911***  -0.0400  0.0037*** 
2 conditions  7.157  0.974***  0.0137  0.0019*** 
3 conditions  12.046  1.197***  0.0207  0.0023*** 
4 conditions  17.160  1.576***  0.0256  0.0031*** 
5 conditions  25.355  2.224***  0.0380  0.0043*** 
Major city  3.874  1.041***  0.0109  0.0020*** 
Inner region  8.377  1.073***  0.0190  0.0021*** 
Constant 82.176  2.053***  0.0664  0.0040*** 
N  175,218     175,218    
R-sq  0.075     0.063    
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Malignant  neoplasm  0.182 0.008 0.143 -0.053  -0.115 0.422  -0.229 0.061  0.11  -0.127 
Benign  neoplasm    0.192 0.021 -0.199  0.081 -0.329 -0.056 -0.072 -0.05  0.551  -0.005 
Diabetes  0.322  -0.321 0.177  -0.066 -0.106  0.133 0.287 0.151 -0.26  -0.115 
Mental  disorders  0.248 0.541 0.106 0.272 -0.114 -0.058 -0.074 0.023  -0.151 0.009 
Eye  diseases  0.474 -0.204  0.003 0.067 0.081  -0.227 -0.088 0.033  0.009  -0.158 
Ear diseases  0.423  -0.088  0.337  -0.047  0.209 -0.133  0.039 0.071 0.002 -0.1 
Parasitic  diseases  0.111 0.271 0.38  -0.142  -0.268  0.04  0.168 0.171 0.289 0.251 
Heart diseases  0.56  -0.311  0.138  -0.084 -0.011 0.065  0.002  0.07  -0.118 0.101 
Nervous system  0.249  0.203  0.113 0.004 -0.157  0.004 0.111 -0.248  0.16  -0.264 
Varicose veins   0.246  -0.065  -0.215  -0.21  0.098  0.216  -0.392 -0.164 -0.047 0.468 
Stomach  diseases  0.421 0.057 -0.114  -0.01  0.017 0.061 0.035 -0.237  -0.122  0.178 
Respiratory  problems  0.332 0.347 -0.175  -0.118  0.004 0.157 -0.006  0.185 0.079 -0.106 
Skin  diseases  0.081 0.036 -0.264  -0.115  0.002 0.266 0.469 -0.294  0.018 0.376 
Bone diseases  0.582  -0.069  0.014  -0.048  0.116 0.028 -0.072  0.047 -0.12  0.103 
Urinary system  0.366  -0.018  -0.136  0.202  -0.162 0.023  -0.086 -0.143 0.1  -0.239 
Congenital  abnormalities  0.098 0.225 -0.241  -0.331  0.374 -0.042  0.072 0.343 -0.034  -0.156 
Fractures  0.165 0.199 -0.154  -0.035  0.409 0.044 0.35  -0.361  0.125 -0.248 
Anaemia  0.23  0.115 -0.02  0.054 -0.28 0.37  0.222  0.011  -0.144  -0.193 
Metabolic  disorders  0.139 0.004 -0.29  0.043 -0.215 -0.404 0.29  0.18  -0.236 0.019 
Thyroid gland  0.242  -0.068  -0.331  0.111 -0.143  -0.39  0.121 0.03  0.067 0.184 
Alcohol  &  drug  0.073 0.451 0.22  0.163 -0.162 -0.174 -0.127 -0.184 -0.415 0.183 
Epilepsy  0.083 0.289 0.205 -0.229  0.262 -0.243 -0.153 -0.347 0.012  -0.078 
Migraine  0.121 0.414 -0.254  -0.144  0.05  0.047 -0.119  0.444 0.053 0.065 
Osteoporosis 0.417  -0.161  -0.068  0.093  0.048 -0.15  -0.258  -0.046  0.185 -0.008 
Diseases of female organs  0.018  0.018  0.034 0.547 0.326 0.014 0.111 0.11  0.238 0.212 
Diseases of male organs  0.094  0.007  0.442  -0.302  0.013 -0.228  0.246 0.07  0.273 0.246 
All other symptoms  0.107  0.052  0.158  0.502 0.325 0.216 0.106 0.188 0.009 0.136 
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Table V: Covariate means for the NHS sample 
 
   Mean  Std.Dev.      Mean  Std.Dev.
Predicted annual premium ($'00)  7.474 5.593   Age 45-49  0.096 0.295 
MLS > premium  0.087 0.283   Age 50-54  0.081 0.273 
Income decile 1^  0.110 0.312   Age 55-59  0.080 0.272 
Income decile 2  0.110 0.313   Age 60-64  0.067 0.250 
Income decile 3  0.078 0.268   Age 65-69  0.058 0.233 
Income decile 4  0.071 0.256   Age 70-74  0.054 0.227 
Income decile 5  0.071 0.257   Age 75-79  0.043 0.203 
Income decile 6  0.071 0.256   Age 80-84  0.032 0.176 
Income decile 7  0.077 0.267   Age 85+  0.018 0.133 
Income decile 8  0.080 0.272   Number of children  0.634 0.984 
Income decile 9  0.092 0.289   Single person, male  0.158 0.364 
Income decile 10  0.103 0.304   Single person, female  0.190 0.392 
Income missing  0.138 0.345   Sole parent  0.066 0.249 
Postgraduate  0.181 0.385   Couple with dependant  0.268 0.443 
Undergraduate  0.123 0.328   Couple only^  0.319 0.466 
Some post-school  0.243 0.429   Foreign born  0.297 0.457 
No post-school^  0.453 0.498   High exercise^  0.053 0.223 
Major city  0.706 0.456   Moderate exercise  0.225 0.418 
Inner regional  0.199 0.399   Low exercise   0.354 0.478 
Outer^  0.095 0.293   No exercise  0.368 0.482 
SAH: excellent^  0.182 0.386   Underweight  0.024 0.154 
SAH: very good  0.337 0.473   Normal weight^  0.402 0.490 
SAH: good  0.291 0.454   Overweight  0.318 0.466 
SAH: fair  0.133 0.339   Obese  0.171 0.377 
SAH: poor  0.058 0.233   Missing weight  0.085 0.279 
# conditions  1.603 1.553   Smoker  0.231 0.422 
Age<20  0.022 0.146   Alcohol: non drinker^  0.190 0.393 
Age 20-24  0.065 0.247   Alcohol: <1 last week  0.210 0.407 
Age 25-29  0.075 0.263   Alcohol: low risk  0.288 0.453 
Age 30-34  0.096 0.295   Alcohol: med risk  0.150 0.357 
Age 35-39  0.106 0.307   Alcohol: high risk  0.162 0.368 
Age 40-44^  0.107 0.308   Glasses  0.613 0.487 
       N  3989     
Note: ^ reference group omitted in regression.   
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Table VI: Probit estimates of hospital admission model 
Variable Coef.  Std.  Err.  P>|z| 
NHS factor1  0.248  0.069  0.000 
NHS factor2  0.107  0.034  0.002 
NHS factor3  0.088  0.032  0.007 
NHS factor4  0.047  0.037  0.205 
NHS factor5  0.098  0.030  0.001 
NHS factor6  -0.015  0.024  0.530 
NHS factor7  0.037  0.023  0.100 
NHS factor8  0.029  0.031  0.352 
NHS factor9  0.010  0.026  0.704 
NHS factor10  0.016  0.024  0.515 
SAH: very good  -0.025  0.077  0.745 
SAH: good  0.147  0.080  0.064 
SAH: fair  0.306  0.098  0.002 
SAH: poor  0.698  0.121  0.000 
Age<20 0.228  0.187  0.222 
Age 20-24  0.357  0.123  0.004 
Age 25-29  0.438  0.115  0.000 
Age 30-34  0.275  0.111  0.014 
Age 35-39  -0.092  0.116  0.429 
Age 45-49  0.052  0.115  0.649 
Age 50-54  -0.053  0.121  0.659 
Age 55-59  0.015  0.119  0.901 
Age 60-64  0.147  0.125  0.237 
Age 65-69  0.104  0.130  0.422 
Age 70-74  0.044  0.136  0.746 
Age 75-79  0.103  0.145  0.476 
Age 80-84  0.282  0.154  0.067 
Age 85+  0.012  0.202  0.954 
Foreign born  -0.173  0.059  0.003 
Male -0.170  0.053  0.001 
# conditions  -0.080  0.058  0.168 
Moderate exercise  0.140  0.127  0.268 
Low exercise   0.095  0.123  0.441 
No exercise  0.078  0.126  0.538 
Smoker -0.089  0.062  0.150 
Alcohol: <1 last week  -0.130  0.077  0.093 
Alcohol: low risk  -0.124  0.074  0.096 
Alcohol: med risk  -0.144  0.088  0.099 
Alcohol: high risk  -0.096  0.088  0.274 
Underweight 0.136  0.149  0.363 
Overweight 0.004  0.059  0.948 
Obese 0.024  0.071  0.740 
Missing weight  -0.228  0.096  0.018 
Major city  0.036  0.084  0.668 
Inner regional  0.141  0.093  0.130 
Constant -0.977  0.200  0.000 
Log-L -1718.7     
N 3989     
Pseudo R-sq  0.077     
Wald test (p-value)  278.47 (0.00)    
Note: White’s heteroskedastic robust standard errors are used. NHS factors are not the same as IWTfactors. 
NHSfactors are derived from NHS sample and IWTfactors are derived from IWT data.  
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Exercise (0 none to 3 high intensity) 0.438  0.138  -0.385  0.400  0.522 
Underweight  -0.241 -0.160 0.151 -0.559 0.693 
Overweight  0.681 -0.474 0.023 -0.190 -0.296 
Obese -0.448  0.545  -0.518  -0.135  -0.209 
Missing weight  -0.367  -0.066  0.564  0.649  0.061 
Smoker 0.131  0.501  0.546  -0.300  -0.231 
Alcohol (0 none to 4 high risk)  0.489  0.526  -0.012  0.122  0.049 
Glasses -0.293  -0.414  -0.340  0.079  -0.257 
Note: the sample size is 3989. 
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Table VIII: NHS means by insurance status 





Dev. Mean  Std.  Dev. 
Insurance 0.450  0.498         
E(w)*Pr(adm) 14.860 11.628  16.194 12.420 13.227  10.349 
Pr(long wait)*Pr(adm)  0.014  0.014 0.015  0.014  0.013  0.012 
Predicted annual premium ($’00)  7.474 5.593  8.034 4.920  6.788 6.253 
MLS > premium  0.087  0.283  0.036  0.186  0.151  0.358 
Income decile 1 (base)  0.110  0.312  0.159  0.366  0.049  0.216 
Income decile 2  0.110  0.313  0.164  0.370  0.043  0.204 
Income decile 3  0.078  0.268  0.103  0.303  0.047  0.213 
Income decile 4  0.071  0.256  0.082  0.275  0.056  0.231 
Income decile 5  0.071  0.257  0.077  0.267  0.064  0.244 
Income decile 6  0.071  0.256  0.072  0.258  0.070  0.255 
Income decile 7  0.077  0.267  0.071  0.256  0.085  0.279 
Income decile 8  0.080  0.272  0.064  0.245  0.100  0.301 
Income decile 9  0.092  0.289  0.062  0.240  0.129  0.335 
Income decile 10  0.103  0.304  0.038  0.191  0.182  0.386 
Income  missing  0.138 0.345  0.109 0.312  0.174 0.379 
Postgraduate 0.181  0.385  0.106 0.308  0.273 0.446 
Undergraduate  0.123 0.328  0.108 0.311  0.140 0.348 
Some post-school  0.243  0.429 0.252  0.434  0.232  0.422 
No post-school (base)  0.453  0.498  0.533  0.499  0.354  0.478 
Major  city  0.706 0.456  0.653 0.476  0.771 0.420 
Inner regional  0.199  0.399 0.226  0.418  0.166  0.372 
Outer  0.095 0.293  0.121 0.326  0.064 0.244 
Lifestyle factor 1  0.000  1.000 0.009  0.993  -0.011  1.008 
Lifestyle factor 2  0.000  1.000 0.140  1.061  -0.171  0.891 
Lifestyle factor 3  0.000  1.000 -0.066  1.080  0.080  0.886 
Lifestyle factor 4  0.000  1.000 -0.160  0.985  0.195  0.984 
Lifestyle factor 5  0.000  1.000 0.021  1.039  -0.025  0.950 
SAH: excellent (base)  0.337  0.473 0.149  0.356  0.222  0.416 
SAH: very good  0.291  0.454  0.298  0.458  0.384  0.486 
SAH:  good  0.133 0.339  0.311 0.463  0.268 0.443 
SAH:  fair  0.058 0.233  0.162 0.369  0.096 0.295 
SAH:  poor  0.337 0.473  0.080 0.271  0.031 0.172 
Age 20-34  0.258  0.438  0.301 0.459  0.206 0.404 
Age 35-49 (base)  0.308  0.462 0.281  0.450  0.342  0.474 
Age 50-64  0.228  0.420  0.184 0.387  0.283 0.450 
Age 65-79  0.155  0.362  0.170 0.376  0.137 0.343 
Age 80+  0.050  0.218  0.064 0.244  0.033 0.180 
Number of children  0.634  0.984  0.637  0.995  0.631  0.971 
Single person, male  0.158  0.364  0.188  0.391  0.120  0.326 
Single person, female  0.190  0.392  0.218  0.413  0.155  0.362 
Sole  parent  0.066 0.249  0.097 0.295  0.029 0.168 
Couple with dependants  0.268  0.443  0.224  0.417  0.322  0.467 
Couple only without dependant (base)  0.319 0.466  0.273 0.446  0.374 0.484 
Foreign  born  0.297 0.457  0.317 0.465  0.273 0.446 
N  3989   2195     1794     
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Table IX: OLS estimates of the insurance demand model  
  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3 
 Coeff.  (s.e.)  Coeff.  (s.e.)  Coeff.  (s.e.) 
E(w)*Pr(adm)     -0.012 (0.002)***  -0.008 (0.003)*** 
Pr(long wait)*Pr(adm)      8.464 (2.257)***  6.754 (2.400)*** 
Predicted premium  -0.002 (0.003)  -0.002  (0.003)  -0.002  (0.003) 
MLS > premium  0.041 (0.038)  0.041  (0.038)  0.042  (0.038) 
Income decile 2  -0.040 (0.026)  -0.040  (0.026)  -0.041  (0.026) 
Income decile 3  0.060 (0.030)** 0.061  (0.030)**  0.059  (0.030)* 
Income decile 4  0.102 (0.034)***  0.105  (0.034)***  0.100  (0.034)*** 
Income decile 5  0.153 (0.034)***  0.154  (0.034)***  0.149  (0.034)*** 
Income decile 6  0.200 (0.034)***  0.201  (0.035)***  0.198  (0.034)*** 
Income decile 7  0.248 (0.034)***  0.247  (0.034)***  0.243  (0.034)*** 
Income decile 8  0.298 (0.034)***  0.300  (0.034)***  0.294  (0.034)*** 
Income decile 9  0.345 (0.034)***  0.344  (0.034)***  0.339  (0.034)*** 
Income decile 10  0.410 (0.043)***  0.408  (0.043)***  0.404  (0.044)*** 
Income missing  0.273 (0.039)***  0.271  (0.039)***  0.270  (0.039)*** 
Postgraduate  0.143 (0.022)***  0.146  (0.022)***  0.144  (0.022)*** 
Undergraduate  0.053 (0.024)** 0.058  (0.024)**  0.054  (0.024)** 
Some post-school  0.021 (0.018)  0.022  (0.018)  0.022  (0.018) 
Major city  0.124 (0.024)***  0.116  (0.024)***  0.118  (0.024)*** 
Inner regional  0.042 (0.026)  0.042  (0.027)  0.039  (0.027) 
Age 20-34  -0.141 (0.019)*** -0.124  (0.019)***  -0.132  (0.020)*** 
Age 50-64  0.111 (0.022)***  0.106  (0.023)***  0.109  (0.023)*** 
Age 65-79  0.096 (0.028)***  0.076  (0.031)**  0.077  (0.031)** 
Age 80+  0.031 (0.040)  0.018  (0.041)  0.014  (0.041) 
Number of children  -0.009 (0.012)  -0.009  (0.012)  -0.010  (0.012) 
Single person, male  -0.128 (0.026)*** -0.139  (0.026)***  -0.134  (0.026)*** 
Single person, female  -0.099 (0.026)*** -0.094  (0.026)***  -0.097  (0.026)*** 
Sole parent  -0.098 (0.036)*** -0.094  (0.036)***  -0.094  (0.036)*** 
Couple with dependant  0.078 (0.030)***  0.076  (0.030)**  0.078  (0.030)** 
Foreign born  -0.100 (0.016)*** -0.112  (0.016)***  -0.107  (0.016)*** 
Lifestyle factor 1  0.003 (0.007)  0.003  (0.007)  0.004  (0.007) 
Lifestyle factor 2  -0.054 (0.008)*** -0.059  (0.008)***  -0.056  (0.008)*** 
Lifestyle factor 3  0.023 (0.007)***  0.027  (0.007)***  0.025  (0.007)*** 
Lifestyle factor 4  0.034 (0.008)***  0.037  (0.008)***  0.034  (0.008)*** 
Lifestyle factor 5  0.008 (0.007)  0.010  (0.007)  0.009  (0.007) 
SAH: very good  0.008 (0.020)      0.008  (0.020) 
SAH: good  -0.047 (0.022)**      -0.039  (0.022)* 
SAH: fair  -0.073 (0.026)***     -0.051  (0.029)* 
SAH: poor  -0.108 (0.034)***     -0.057  (0.046) 
Constant  0.223 (0.053)***  0.258  (0.052)***  0.257  (0.054)*** 
R-sq 0.25 0.25  0.26 
F (p-value)  62.46 (0.00)  66.99 (0.00)  60.26 (0.00) 
Note: *, **, *** denotes p-values less than 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. The base groups for income, education, 
location, self-assessed health (SAH), age and income unit type are: the lowest income group, no post school 
qualification, outer regional, excellent health, age 35-49 and couple without dependant, respectively. Demand for PHI 
Disinvestment 
Demand for PHI 
Disinvestment 
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Figure 1: Fit of predicted waiting times (IWT sample) 
 
 
Note: the straight line is a 45-degree line. Each point is the scatter plot of mean actual 
waiting time and  
predicted waiting time for 5
th, 10
th, … 95































0 50 100 150 200 250
OLS prediction 
     31  
Expected waiting times 
Figure 2: Impact of expected wait and probability of a long wait on the 
predicted probability of insurance 
 
Note: solid line represents the predicted probability from a model without waiting time variables. 
Connected circles and dotted lines represent the predicted insurance share at the mean of long wait 
(p90) holding the expected wait at its appropriate percentile; dotted lines show 95% confidence interval. 
Each marker “x” indicates the predicted insurance share at individuals’ percentiles of long wait, holding 
the expected wait at its appropriate decile value. Heterogeneity within expected wait percentile is due to 
individuals with lower or higher percentile of long wait than the mean. The following table reports the 
representative weight (%) of each marker. * indicates empty cells. 
 
  Distribution of expected wait 
Distribution of long 
wait  5 10  20  30 40 50 60 70 80  90  95 
5  71.9  18.5  1.8  1.0  1.3 * 0.3 *  *  0.5  * 
10  26.6  46.5  10.5 2.0 0.3 0.5 0.3  *  *  *  * 
20  1.5  34.0  50.9  21.6 7.8 1.5 0.3  *  0.3  *  * 
30 *  1.0  33.6  37.3  17.3  8.5 2.0 0.3 0.3  0.3  * 
40 *  *  3.3  34.3  39.1  15.0  6.0  1.8  0.3  0.3  * 
50  *  *  *  3.8  32.1 42.6 16.0  2.5  2.3  0.5  0.5 
60  *  *  *  *  2.3  30.1 45.9 16.5 4.8  0.5  * 
70 *  *  *  *  *  1.8  29.1  51.6  15.5  1.8  0.5 
80 *  *  *  *  *  *  0.3  27.1  56.4  15.3 2.0 
90  * *  *  * * * *  0.3  20.3  67.2 22.6
95  * *  *  * * * * * *  13.8 58.8
100  * *  *  * * * * * *  *  15.6
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